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The fast developing relationship between the European Union (EU) and China during 
the past three decades has been regarded both as indicative of an emerging 21st 
century axis in the West (Shambaugh, 2004), and as a move towards a mature, 
healthy and stable state in China (Dai 2005). Although some scholars still doubt how 
far this strategic partnership is real (Algieri, 2008; Holslag, 2011), there is no doubt 
that EU-China relations feature prominently in international politics. Nevertheless, 
since 2006 the partnership has not been going smoothly; it lacks mutual 
understanding (Men, 2009). 
 
In this context, knowing how each side views the other is highly significant for the 
further development of bilateral relations. Since the mid-1990s, the EU has 
published six China policy papers, also known as Communications of the Commission, 
and two country strategies. These policy papers trace the evolution of EU’s 
understanding and interpretation of China’s development and change, together with 
the EU’s strategies for its relations with China at the institutional level. But how can 
we learn China’s views of this relationship and its attitudes towards EU’s deepening 
integration process, international role and their partnership? China’s two EU Policy 
Papers, published in 2003 and 2014, are certainly not sufficient to answer this 
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question. Scattered speeches by high-level Chinese officials will not allow us to track 
continuity and change in thinking. In the circumstances, this article argues that for 
countries such as China, where the policy-making process is opaque, one of our 
methods can be to use their propaganda to help trace the changes in government 
thinking. The article aims to track Chinese government’s expectations of the EU and 
EU-China relations through a media analysis approach in the hope of making three 
contributions to the existing literature: first, theoretically, developing a notion of 
‘Reflexive Expectations’ to help understand the relationship; second, 
methodologically, demonstrating the value for International Relations of research 
methods developed within media studies; and third, empirically, complementing 
existing analyses of external understandings of the EU by providing a longitudinal 
study of Chinese perceptions. 
 
‘Reflexive Expectations’ and China’s changing national identity 
In examining the EU’s international role and foreign relations, Hill (1993) argues that 
the EU’s capabilities in the international system are much more limited than the 
expectations of them due to its lack of substantial resources and problems in its 
political structure. He characterises this as the ‘Capability-Expectations Gap’ (CEG), 
and warned of its dangers (Hill, 1993, p.315). Although the gap was seen by 2008 to 
have narrowed, Toje (2008) further developed the concept of the CEG by arguing 
that the primary reason why the EU is still failing to deliver the foreign and security 
policies expected of it is the lack of decision-making procedures that can overcome 
dissent; therefore, while the consensus-expectations gap exists, the EU is likely to 
remain a partial and inconsistent foreign policy actor. The Lisbon Treaty may have 
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marked a new era in EU diplomacy, but the CEG has not as yet narrowed 
substantially. 
 
In the case of EU’s role in Asia, a rather different gap has been identified. According 
to Tsuruoka (2008), who examines EU’s relations with Japan, the reason why EU-
Japanese relations cannot flourish is because Japanese expectations of the EU are 
too little: the EU is perceived to be distant and ineffectual. Tsuruoka calls this the 
‘Expectation Deficit’ (ED). The ED is seen as dominant in many other Asian countries 
too. In an examination of elite perceptions of the EU in three key ASEAN states, 
Indonesia, Singapore and Vietnam, Wong (2012) maintains that they have a large 
expectation deficit in the political and military realms, juxtaposed with high 
expectations of the EU’s capability in the economic arena. 
 
The EU’s relationship with China, however, is a different case. Like the Europeans 
themselves, the Chinese people have positive expectations of the EU as an 
international actor (European Commission, 2005). But this does not necessarily 
mean that the EU has become a stronger actor on the world stage or a closer partner 
of China. Regarding the EU as a major force in the world (China 2003) and as a 
strategic partner, China’s expectations of the EU are not in deficit; but in foreign 
policy terms putting the EU on the secondary level (Yahuda, 1994; Holslag, 2011, 
p.309) suggests that China’s expectations are not high. Most importantly, the 
expectations of the EU as an actor have constantly been re-examined and changed 
over time. Based on the social constructivist approach, this study argues that neither 
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CEG nor ED can directly apply to China’s relations with the EU; instead, China holds 
‘Reflexive Expectations’, which from time to time it adjusts.  
 
Social constructivists contend that state identities and interests are central 
determinants of state behaviour (Wendt, 1992; Finnemore 1996). The identities of 
states emerge from their interactions with different social environments, both 
domestic and international (Katzenstein, 1996, p.2). Thus, state identities change 
and are intersubjective. In relations with the EU, China’s national identity shapes 
how China sees itself and the EU as the ‘other’. Since its economic reforms in 1978, 
China has come a long way, changing from a low-income country to the world’s 
second largest economy, from a revisionist state to a status quo power, and from a 
passive participator in the world system to an active stakeholder in international 
society (Wong, 2013; Qin, 2010). As this process has continued, China’s national 
identity has been redefined. Since changes in state identity affect the national 
security interests or policies of states (Jepperson et al, 1996, p.52), the redefinition 
of China’s identity from an outsider to a participant in international society (Qin, 
2010) influences its view and expectations of the EU. This process of developing 
expectations reflexively reveals how China has seen itself, the EU and the outside 
world over time; this process has continued to be shaped by China’s changing 
national identity and interests and also by its perception of the EU’s capability at 
various times and in various situations.  
 
Although scholars have paid attention to the construction of China’s national identity 
(see, Li and Xu, 2006; Qin, 2010) and have assessed how the changing identity may 
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have influenced bilateral relations between the EU and China (see, Men, 2006; Wong, 
2013), empirical evidence, particularly from a systematic longitudinal study, has 
largely been absent. This is partly because the non-transparent political system adds 
to the difficulty of obtaining the data for international studies. To overcome this, this 
study suggests using a novel approach to this relationship, and employs a method 
from media studies. It uses media content and discourse analysis to examine, 
longitudinally, how the EU as an international actor and as China’s partner is 
represented in its mouthpiece newspaper. 
 
Government views on European countries and the Chinese news media 
It has long been assumed that the Chinese news media are the ‘loyal eyes, ears and 
tongue’ of the Party-state (Chang, 1989, p.163). Despite globalization and 
commercialization, and media reform, the nature of Chinese media has not changed: 
they continue to serve the Party initiatives, notably, in terms of reporting foreign 
relations. Yao (2005, p.7), a former vice editor-in-chief of the Xinhua News Agency, 
defines the nature of Chinese foreign news coverage like this:  ‘[o]ur foreign news 
reporting has a political nature, and it should embody the policies of the Party and 
the state. Above all those policies are diplomatic policy, propaganda policy and other 
related policies.’  
 
In the past, a change in attitude of the Chinese government to the European 
Community (EC) could easily be seen through the media. During the first few years 
after the People’s Republic of China was founded, Europe, and the European 
Economic Community (EEC) in particular, was regarded as a political entity 
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representing Western imperialist countries; an American ally and tool of the United 
States under Washington’s control; and a political entity in the struggle between the 
two superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States (Song, 2008; Editorial 
Group, 1973). A news story by Ta Kung Pao on the formation of the European 
Common Market reported that China saw it as ‘dependent on the United States’.2 
With the change in geopolitical concerns in the 1960s, China started to see the 
Franco-German axis of EEC integration in an anti-American light. The Peking Review 
(now called Beijing Review) (1962, p.22), China’s most reputable English language 
news magazine, reported this as a move to ‘squeeze out US and British influences 
from western Europe’. After the Sino-Soviet split and above all in the 1970s, Beijing 
saw a united, militarily strong, US-linked and anti-Soviet Western Europe as a major 
guarantee of China’s own security (Garver, 1993, p.105). The Peking Review started 
to run positive stories on the EEC’s consolidation into the EC and on the enlargement 
into ten member states. For instance, between 1971 and 1973 the Peking Review 
argued that EC enlargement was ‘another harsh blow to the tottering hegemony of 
EU imperialism in Western Europe and … further isolated it’; it claimed that ‘the 
enlargement of the Common Market is from many aspects a setback for the Soviet 
Union’; that the proposals on European Monetary Union ‘reflect the desire of the 
West European countries to get rid of superpower domination and interference by 
strengthening unity’, and so on (Scott, 2007, pp.218-9).  
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With the deepening of EU integration and the EU’s global role since the 1990s, how 
has China’s attitude to, and view of, the EEC/EU as an international actor changed 
over time? With the development of bilateral relations, particularly the building of 
the so-called ‘all-round strategic partnership’, how does the Chinese government see 
this partnership, and what does the state expect from it? Unlike Brussels, politics in 
China is restricted to a small number of decision-makers, making it difficult to track 
the changes in the thinking of Chinese government on a regular basis. However, the 
political nature of the foreign news reporting by the Chinese state media enables us 
to understand the position that the Chinese government has taken.  
 
Little research has focused on Chinese media representation of the EU, though much 
attention has been drawn to the perception of the EU among the Chinese public and 
a variety of other stakeholders (see, Men, 2006; Zhu, 2008; Dong et al, 2013). In 
2006, the China work package of the ‘EU through the Eyes of Asia’ project, funded by 
the Asia-Europe Foundation and the National Centre for Research on Europe in New 
Zealand, monitored the coverage of the EU and ASEM in four media outlets, the 
People’s Daily, the International Finance News, the China Daily and one news bulletin 
from China Central Television (CCTV-1). In this study, Dai and Zhang (2007) found 
that the volume of EU stories was greatest in the People’s Daily and smallest in the 
CCTV1 news bulletin; among those news stories only 18per cent reported the EU in 
its own context, 42per cent reported the EU in the context of a third country and 
40per cent in the domestic context. Another study examined the reporting of the EU 
in the first half of 2006 by a local television station, and argued that the coverage of 
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the EU in news and cultural programmes in Shanghai television reflected the Chinese 
perception of the EU and the state of Sino-EU relations at that time (Li, 2007).  
 
Unfortunately, these studies provided only a snapshot of the media presentation of 
the EU in China and cannot tell us about the changes, if any, in the media discourse 
of the EU or the government’s expectations of, and attitude toward, the EU over 
time. The research presented here, in contrast, uses a longitudinal approach and 
pictures China’s shifts in understanding and expectations of the EU by analysing the 
content of media representations and discourses as it changes over time.  
 
Methodology and data results 
The study derives from analysis of the media coverage of EU and EU-China relations 
in the People’s Daily for a period of 26 years, from 1989 to 2014. The People’s Daily 
is China’s most politically important newspaper. Although different Chinese media 
outlet may yield some variations in the reporting of the EU, only the People’s Daily 
can be described as most closely representing the government line. Hence, for the 
purposes of the study, which is to argue the Chinese government engaged in a 'reflexive 
expectations' approach to the EU over time, rather than analysing how the EU 
is represented in the Chinese media, the People’s Daily was chosen. As Wu, a former 
senior editor in the International News Department of the newspaper claims, 
‘[r]eaders can comprehend the Chinese government’s diplomatic guidelines, foreign 
policies and the attitude to significant international issues at a certain time period by 
reading through the People’s Daily. (2005, p.246)’  
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This study follows the constructivist approach adopted by Bretherton and Vogler 
(2006) and considers the three elements in being an actor (‘actorness’) - presence, 
opportunity and capability - which combine in varying ways to shape the 
representation/construction of the EU’s external activities in Chinese news media. 
According to Bretherton and Vogler (2006, p.24), opportunity denotes factors in the 
external environment of ideas and events which constrain or enable actorness; it 
signifies the structural context of action. Presence conceptualizes the ability of the 
EU, by virtue of its existence, to exert influence beyond its borders. Capability refers 
to the internal context of the EU’s external actions, particularly the availability of 
policy instruments and understanding the Unions’ ability to utilize these instruments, 
in response to opportunity and/or to capitalize on presence. 
 
1989 is chosen as the starting point because EU-China relations deteriorated to their 
lowest after the Tiananmen Square Incident. After years of downturn, bilateral ties 
started to warm in 2011 (Li and Ai, 2011), and in April 2014 China published its 
second EU policy paper. This marks a useful endpoint for the data collection. 
 
The study sampled every 17th days from 1st January 1989 to 31st December 2014. 
The reason for this sampling interval was that (1) 7 days or multiples of 7 were not 
appropriate, since 7 days make up a week, (2) 17 days is nearly two and a half weeks; 
this meant that the research would sample about two days of a daily newspaper’s 
output per month, which allows a reasonable quantity of data to be analysed for the 
purposes of the study. The sample includes 559 days altogether. Unlike the project 
mentioned above, the ‘EU through the eyes of Asia’ (Holland et al, 2007), which used 
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a key word search concerning the EU and collected all the stories containing the key 
words, including those only mentioning the EU in passing, this research did not use a 
key word search. It collected all the international news stories on the front page and 
the international news pages on the sampled days. In Holland and Chaban’s project, 
only 18per cent collected stories reported the EU as their major focus, while the 
majority reported the EU as their secondary or minor focus, or mentioned the EU 
only in passing (Dai and Zhang, 2007). This method is of not much help when a 
discourse analysis is wanted. Therefore, the analysis in this study includes only those 
with the EU and European countries as their main focus.  
 
For its quantitative analysis, the study collected 10,995 international news stories in 
total; among them 15.2per cent (1669 pieces) reported the EC/EU and its member 
states as their main focus. Other stories focused on the United States, Russia, Japan 
and other countries in the region, as well as international organizations such as the 
UN, NATO, and ASEAN, etc. Stories with the EU specifically and EU-China relations as 
their primary focus accounted for 3.2per cent (347 pieces) of the total of stories 
collected. This suggests that the attention drawn to the EC/EU by the People’s Daily 
was limited, which is in accordance with the secondary importance given to the EU in 
China’s foreign relations (Yahuda, 1994; Holslag, 2011, p.309). The quantitative 
media content analysis is limited to the data collected for the purposes of the study, 
but the qualitative analysis examines a wider range of articles published by the 
People’s Daily over the period under survey. Moreover, interviews with Chinese 
journalists stationed in Brussels for the People’s Daily and the Xinhua News Agency, 
and foreign officials on both sides are also used. 
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The data indicate that in China’s most authoritative newspaper the EU has low 
visibility. This conforms to the findings from the China data in the ‘EU through the 
eyes of Asia’ project (Dai and Zhang, 2007), even though the two used different 
methods of data collection. However, the changing volume of news stories 
concerning the EU and EU member states in this longitudinal study reveals that, 
although the overall visibility of Europe (excluding Russia) declined over time, the 
presence of the EU remained relatively stable. This means that the proportion of EU 
stories to the total of stories on Europe increased, indicating the growing importance 
that China attached to the EU. To some extent, this reflects the increased 
expectation overall that China holds of the EU as a whole (Figure 1). In the next 
section, I analyse how China’s ‘reflexive expectations’ of the EU are reflected in the 
People’s Daily reports over time.  
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
 
Reflexive expectations of the EU as a pole in a multi-polar world 
As early as November 1990, the People’s Daily reported that over 50 Chinese experts 
in European Studies from academia and governmental institutions had gathered 
together in Beijing to discuss the structure of Europe after the unification of 
Germany and the future development of the EEC. Most experts in the conference 
agreed, according to the paper, that the structure of Europe was in transition and 
the strength of Europe depended on the deepening integration of the EEC. The 
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experts, it was reported, believed that with the collapse of the Yalta system and the 
weakening of the tension between the two superpowers would mean that the 
bipolar world structure would become multi-polar and Europe, with its increasing 
political and economic independence, could be one of the poles (Zhang, 1990). That 
is, the external environment provided an opportunity for a united Europe to become 
an actor in international politics, and China expected a more integrated and 
independent EEC to fulfil this role. This report to some extent defines the official 
Chinese view of Europe in the post-Cold War period. The follow-on reports on the 
EEC in the People’s Daily strengthened this view. For instance, the Maastricht Treaty, 
which was designed to set up the mechanism of a political and economic 
supranational union of Europe, was salient in the 1992-3 coverage. 31per cent of EU 
reports in 1992 and 22per cent in 1993 related to the Treaty. The news stories also 
reported the difficulties that the Treaty encountered over the referendums in the 
member states. But the overall discourse stressed that the implementation of the 
Maastricht Treaty would make possible the presence of the EU as an international 
actor at the institutional level, and this would be the direction that Europe would 
take.  
 
The search for a multi-polar world order fitted with China’s national interests after 
the end of the Cold War. Following the Tiananmen Square Incident, the achievement 
of social and economic development and political stability had become the priority 
for the Chinese government. At the international level, a peaceful and stable 
international environment was crucial for China’s development. China tried in the 
1990s to involve itself in the international system through participation in 
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international economic, development, trade and financial organizations, such as the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization, the International 
Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the global private financial community 
(Lampton, 2001, p.9), though when it began, China was only a passive participant 
(Qin 2003). However, such involvement has not been easy because of the linkage 
made by Western countries (particularly the US) between trade issues and China’s 
human rights record (see Copper, 1997; Kent, 1995; Baker, 2002). The US, as China’s 
most significant market, a major investor of capital, technology and management 
skills as well as the single most decisive shaper and definer of the international 
system, is regarded as the most important country for China’s peace and 
development in the international environment (Gong, 2004, p.168). The Chinese 
official line sees the source of international conflict as questions of hegemony and 
big-power politics and the US as the sole superpower acts like hegemony (Chan, 
1999, p.131). For China, a better international order would be a multi-polar world, 
where it is one pole among others, rather than a world order dominated by the US. 
In contrast to the EU in Japan’s expectation deficit (Tsuruoka, 2008), an integrated 
EU could in the Chinese leadership’s eyes be ‘a major force in the world’ (China, 
2003), which could at some future date join with China in resisting US hegemony. 
 
The expectation of the EU’s role as one pole in a multi-polar world shapes the media 
framing of the EU in two main ways: the EU as an economic power and trade actor 
and the EU as a political actor. These expectations occupy 39.5per cent and 40.3per 
cent respectively of the coverage across the 26 years under study. The third largest 
frames the EU as China’s cooperative partner (13.8per cent), a prospect which is 
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discussed in the next section. The rest frame the EU as an environmental actor 
(3.5per cent), social actor (0.9per cent) and in other roles (2.0per cent). It is worth 
noting that the political framing of the EU exceeds its economic framing. This may 
indicate that China has a slightly higher expectation of the EU as a political actor than 
as an economic one. But this should be examined in more detail by focusing on the 
tone and discourse of the reporting. Below I examine how China’s expectations of 
the EU’s role as an economic power and trade actor and then as a political actor 
have changed over time, and also how these representations reflect the Chinese 
government’s interests and national identity. 
 
The EU as an economic power and trade actor 
Over the period in question, the tone of the EU economic and trade stories varied 
greatly. China in the early 1990s did not seem to anticipate a fast growing European 
economy. The EEC’s internal economic situation was reported in a negative tone, 
with a focus on the high level of unemployment and slow economic growth. This 
coverage, on the one hand, showed Europe’s situation at the time, but, more 
importantly, the negative framing fitted the propaganda needs of the Chinese 
government. At first, after the Tiananmen Square Incident, all the new cooperative 
projects between China and Europe were postponed (Baker, 2002, p.49). The 
economic links between the two parties decreased, and this was not in the interests 
of either side. A negative media image of the European economy at the time would 
have been helpful: it might have calmed China’s instability after the 1989 turmoil, 
particularly in a context in which the ‘Chinese government takes economic 
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construction as the central task of the whole country and makes reform and opening 
up one of its basic state policies’ (Ong, 2002, p.23). 
 
Nevertheless, China expected to see the EU strengthened as an economic power and 
trade actor as a result of its successful economic integration. News stories about the 
creation of Europe’s single market and European Economic Area (EEA) adopted a 
positive tone; and more than two-thirds of them spoke highly of the launch of the 
Euro. The People’s Daily regarded the new currency as a symbol of the success of 
European economic integration, which, as the reports emphasized, would lead the 
EU to be the most powerful economic entity in the world. The launch of this unitary 
currency was not only reported as a crucial step in the development and integration 
of the EU per se (Liu and Yang, 1998), but more explicitly was expected to be of 
significance to the structure of the international finance system and to challenge the 
hegemony of the US dollar in the international financial market (See, Zheng and 
Zhang, 1999; Yao 2002).  This expectation has continued and still guides China’s 
holdings of foreign reserves. China, the world largest holder of foreign reserves, has 
between one-fifth and one-third of its currency portfolio in Euros, according to 
estimates, though the greatest share, between half and two-thirds, is in US Dollars 
(Hu, 2010, pp.8-9). 
 
The expectation that the Euro would play a greater role in the world’s financial 
markets faded during the 2008-9 global financial crises, most of all when it came to 
the Eurozone sovereignty debt crisis. The inconsistency of financial policies among 
member states was seen to weaken the EU’s economic capability, whilst in the 
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meantime China itself rose as the world’s second largest economy. The discourse 
about the EU’s economic presence changed. Although the EU was still seen as an 
influential and powerful trading bloc for China and the world as a whole, the 
People’s Daily gave the discourse a negative tone after 2008 (Figure 2).  
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
Nonetheless, we can see from this newspaper’s coverage that China expected the EU 
to recover its economic buoyancy; it had confidence in the currency and the EU’s 
capability to resolve the debt crisis. This crisis was presented only as a problem 
within the EU, not affecting its international role. The EU’s various efforts to solve 
the problem were highly visible in the news. In some accounts, the attitude to the 
issue tended to be positive. This is shown from their headlines; for instance, 
‘Coordinating economic policies is fundamental’ (Liu, 2010), ‘Harmony and unity 
bring security’ (Gu, 2010), ‘The EU: first ensure stability, then seek development’ (Liu 
et al, 2010), and so on.  
 
The EU as a political actor 
Among all the news stories concerning the EU’s political integration, most coverage 
adopted a positive or neutral tone with only 10.3per cent negatively reporting the 
debates, arguments and negotiations accompanying the process. For the most of the 
time since 2001, the EU has represented a political story. This has changed only in the last 
five years when the focus has been on the Eurozone crisis (Figure 3). The positive media 
discourses about the Maastricht Treaty, the Amsterdam Treaty and the EU 
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enlargements portrayed the EU as a developing political union, indicating that 
internal political integration would strengthen the EU’s opportunity and presence as 
a player in international politics. China had hopes, too, that the EU’s capability 
would qualify it for this role. As a Chinese scholar declared, ‘The enlargements of the 
EU give it new expectations in forming the world order’ (Huo, 2004, p.50).  
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
From Bosnia-Herzegovina to Chechnya, from Kosovo to Palestine-Israel, from Iraq to 
Iran, from Libya to Syria, the EU has been highly visible in the news reporting. 
Positioning the EU as one pole in a multi-polar world, the framing of the EU as a 
political actor illustrated China’s expectation of the EU’s capability. Not only could 
the EU’s voices frequently be heard, but, more explicitly, the newspaper tended to 
emphasize the EU whenever it took a different approach from that of the US, while 
still recognising that they were allies. Stories such as  ‘Western Countries Oppose US 
Cuba Sanction’ (Xu, 1995), ‘Situation in Kosovo: EU Criticizes US to Exaggerate the 
Crisis’ (Zheng, 1998), ‘Protocol: EU Asks US to Keep Promises’ (Zhou and Zheng, 
2001), and ‘Latin America-EU Summit: Condemning US Solders’ Prisoner Abuses’ (Xu, 
2004) suggested that China expected the EU to play a different role or to 
counterbalance the US, albeit to a limited extent, in international politics. 
‘Strategically, China wants the EU to be more powerful and integrated so that it can 
become a pole in the world, even though this might not necessarily mean that China 
and the EU would become politically closer,’ said an EU correspondent at the Xinhua 
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News Agency. He continued:  ‘However, a powerful EU can dismantle the power of 
the US in the world.’3 
 
Nonetheless, expectations of actorness are not the same as the effectiveness of 
actorness. In these stories, the EU had been represented as an active player rather 
than an effective player. The presence of the EU was often seen as weakened by the 
lack of consensus among the member states, resonating with Hill’s CEG (1993) and 
Toje’s consensus-expectation gap (2008). Although the EU’s visibility in international 
affairs was high, China started to doubt its capability and the expectations declined 
steadily. The media coverage focused mainly on the EU’s visibility, especially on the 
occasions when the EU’s voices were shown to be different from those of the US, but 
China had low expectations of its effectiveness (see, Xu, 1995; Zheng, 1998). After 
the Lisbon Treaty, the most visible face of the EU even changed from the EU ‘foreign 
minister’ Ashton’s to the German Chancellor Merkel’s (Zhang and Loke, 2011) in the 
Chinese media representations of the EU. 
 
Furthermore, the 2004 EU enlargement was much more intensively covered than the 
two earlier enlargements had been, with more background information, in-depth 
analysis and editorials. The People’s Daily attached more significance to its political 
role in advancing the peace and stability of the continent than to its significance in 
economic terms. It believed that the EU would become a new peace-seeking power 
in the world. An editorial stated that ‘The countries belonging to two former 
oppositional military blocs are now able to sit at the same table to discuss their 
                                                            
3 Personal interview, 6 July 2007, Brussels.  
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cooperative development. This is the biggest “political benefit” for the two 
sides.’(Yao, 2003) 
 
Nevertheless, the media discourse does not show greater Chinese expectations that 
the EU would become a stronger or greater actor from its increased number of 
member states. Only in a long term was enlargement seen as a good way for the EU 
to function as one pole in a multi-pole world (see, Editorial, 1994; Tang, 2000; Yao, 
2003).  
 
Reflexive expectations of the EU as a partner 
Since 1988 the EU has been presented in the People’s Daily as China’s cooperative 
partner, when the two built up their partnership (European Commission 1998). In 
general, this type of framing is prominent in the coverage and closely linked with the 
development of, and changes in, the relationship of the two. The media discourse 
shows that expectations of the EU as a friendly and effective partner of China had 
been growing along with the fast and positive development of their bilateral 
relations. It reached a peak in 2003, when China published its first EU Policy Paper, 
as a response to the EU’s publication of its China policy, which was to establish a 
strategic partnership with China in September of the same year. This intention began 
to wane in 2006.  
 
Guided by its strategy of ‘cooperative security’ [Hezuo anquan] as a national interest 
and implementing it in its diplomatic activities, China sought to expand its relations, 
particularly in respect of economic policy, with countries that could help it 
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modernize quickly during the 1990s (Liu, 2006, pp.33-4). Not only are the economies 
of China and the EU essentially complementary to each other, but there are no 
regional conflicts between the two sides, and no complications touching on the issue 
of Taiwan. China regarded the EU as an ideal alternative to Japan or the US, putting 
it in a good position to establish favourable trading terms (Klein, 1998, p.135). The 
fast upgrade of relations with China in EU’s external relations between 1995 and 
2003 also nurtured China’s expectations of this ‘full partnership’ (China, 2003) as one 
that might be truly strategic.  
 
Apart from stories of the EU’s condemnation of China’s human rights record and 
trade disputes, 85.7per cent of the bilateral relations stories adopted a neutral or 
positive tone. They included accounts of bilateral economic and trade relations, 
speeches by authorities, reciprocal official visits and environmental, technological 
and information co-operation between the EU and China. ‘Because Sino-EU relations 
are very well developed’, a senior editor in the International Department of the 
Xinhua News Agency explained, ‘we usually report the EU in a positive way. A story 
with a very negative tone will be killed.’4 
 
From 1989 to 2005, bilateral economic and trade relations, as well as cooperation on 
various projects, are the two largest groups in the coverage of EU-China relations 
(Figure 4). This reflects the presence of the EU acting as China’s partner. In 
economics and trade, since 2004 the EU has become China’s largest trading partner 
and China has become the EU’s second largest (after the US). On the environment, 
                                                            
4 Personal interview, 4 August 2006, Beijing. 
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the EU has since 2007 become the biggest buyer of Chinese Certified Emission 
Reduction. The EU funded some of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
projects in China - by September 2011, 45.96per cent of all registered CDM projects.5 
In science and technology, the EU is China’s top technology supplier. For instance, 
the Galileo cooperative plan is treated by China as the ‘aircraft carrier’ of the 
scientific and technological cooperation between the two sides (China, 2003). The 
newspaper gave extensive coverage to this cooperation and stressed that ‘China is 
the first country outside the European Union that has signed this applied project 
contract with the EU and this is also the biggest external scientific and technological 
cooperation project that China has ever had’(see, Lv; 2003; Wu, 2005; Lv, 2005). In 
reporting EU-China co-operation, the news stories have sometimes given detailed 
information about the projects, sometimes described the cooperative progress and 
sometimes praised the achievements. The messages sent from the media discourse 
were that the EU and China had established cooperative partnerships in a great 
many fields and in numerous cooperative projects; both sides were reported as 
pleased with the outcomes and benefiting from the cooperation. In the meantime, 
although friction and disputes have increased since 2005 with the increase of the 
trade deficit in China’s favour, the coverage of this negative aspect has been 
minimized.6 
 
[Figure 4 about here] 
                                                            
5 http://cdm.ccchina.gov.cn/web/NewsInfo.asp?NewsId=5582, Accessed on 30 September, 2011. 
6 Personal interview with a correspondent for Xinhua News Agency based in Brussels, Brussels, 1 July 
2007.  
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In 2006, the EU published the most recent statement of its policy toward China, 
entitled ‘EU-China: Closer Partners, Growing Responsibilities’. From the Chinese 
officials’ point of view, the EU’s tone toward China seems to have changed. It was 
not as friendly and cooperative as it had been in the EU’s previous policy papers.7 
China did not respond by issuing a new policy paper, as it did in 2003, which was 
something of a disappointment to the EU.8 Equally, China was disappointed at the 
EU’s negative responses to the two requests that China made in its first EU policy 
paper, one, in particular, to lift arms embargo against China and one to grant China 
full market economic status. The arms embargo issue was covered intensively in the 
People’s Daily from 2003, when the issue was publicly raised, to 2006, when China 
became very disappointed. From the standpoint of the Chinese government, the 
EU’s arms embargo against China symbolized ‘political discrimination’ and was a 
‘legacy of the Cold War’; to qualify relations with China as ‘strategic’, the EU would 
have had to end the embargo, which put China in the same category as Zimbabwe 
and Myanmar (AFP, 2005). The pending of this EU decision made the Chinese 
government further realize the presence weakness in the political relations between 
the two sides as well as the capability weakness that the supranational and 
intergovernmental EU has in speaking with one voice when it comes to external 
decisions. EU-China relations have not been at a strategic level as they are on paper, 
and many other factors are stronger than the links between them, such as the 
                                                            
7 Personal interview with an official in the Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the European 
Union, 19 November 2010, Brussels 
8 Personal interview with a China policy official in the European Commission, Brussels 6 July 2007 
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member states factor, US factor, human rights factor, and so on. This echoes Holslag 
(2011, p.310) who says that ‘one cannot expect Europe to foster a strategic 
partnership if it is hardly considered to be a strategic actor.’ Even the European side 
had noticed a decline in China’s expectations. ‘For some years, China has appeared 
to believe more strongly in Europe's role as a serious player on the world stage than 
we do ourselves. It is difficult to believe that this is still true’, said Chris Patten (2005). 
 
Disappointed at EU’s consensus-expectation gap at the institutional level, China 
spoke of the importance, when dealing with the EU, of developing bilateral relations 
with its member states. Since 2006, reports on the European member states as well 
as official visits and meetings between China and European countries have increased, 
resulting in a decline of the proportion of EU news since then (Figure 1). During the 
past five years China’s top leaders have visited nearly half the EU member states and 
bought national bonds of some of the states they have visited, such as Spain, 
Portugal, and Ireland, to help with their sovereignty debt crisis and deepen economic 
and trade cooperation with them. The EU has been moved further down in China’s 
ranking as a strategic partner (Chen, 2006). China started to hold a more cautious 
and realistic expectation of this partnership, particularly with the changes in China 
and EU’s economic might after the financial crisis. For instance, when reporting the 
Eurozone debt crisis, China was reported to have offered a ‘helping hand’ to the 
European partners and the EU countries were said to have ‘[boarded] the China 
Express’ in order to extricate themselves from a problematic situation (Lai and Zhang, 
2013). 
 
24 
 
Conclusions 
This paper has tracked the evolution of China’s attitude toward the EU and the EU-
China relations. Its aim has been to understand better the relationship since the end 
of the Cold War. Based on an understanding of the close media-state relations in 
China, it has advocated linking the news media, particularly the authoritative Party 
organ newspapers, with foreign relations as a practical way to trace the changes in 
Chinese attitudes, policy and strategy in its foreign relations. The study 
demonstrates that, methodologically, analysing media coverage helps our 
understanding of international relations, particularly with regard to countries with 
an opaque policy-making process. 
 
Drawing on Hill (1993) and his Capability-Expectations Gap and the Expectation 
Deficit of Tsuruoka (2008), theoretically, the study developed a notion of ’Reflexive 
Expectations‘ in the Chinese government’s behaviour, as neither CEG nor ED can be 
fully and directly applied to the context of the EU’s relations with China. At the 
macro level, China’s expectations of the EU have never been in deficit; on the 
contrary, it expected a united Europe to be a major force in the multi-polar system 
that China sought. This expectation has continued even though China has noticed 
the EU’s capability gap. At the micro level, China’s expectations of the EU’s actorness 
in terms of opportunity, presence and capability have been reflexively constructed. 
This ‘Reflexive Expectation’ is determined by the changing of China’s national 
interests and identity, as well as the development and changes in the EU and in 
bilateral relations. The government’s mouthpiece newspaper reflects how those 
changes shape China’s view of the EU and their partnership. During the 26 years 
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under study, the EU’s economic and political integration process has been reported 
frequently and positively as a good opportunity for a stronger EU, though its 
presence and capability constrain China’s expectations of the EU and the EU-China 
partnership from time to time. While the world economy was in recession and the 
Eurozone was in a severe debt crisis, China sailed through the financial crisis. It 
regards itself as a responsible big country (Li and Xu 2006) and is becoming an active 
participator in the international community (Qin 2010). This changing domestic and 
international profile also influences China’s expectations of the EU and their 
partnership.  
 
A decade has passed since the honeymoon of bilateral relations in 2003. The 
relationship has cooled down and warmed up. In April 2014, China (2014) published 
its second EU policy paper defining its EU policy objectives in the new era, drawing a 
blueprint for China-EU cooperation in the next 5 to 10 years and facilitating greater 
progress in China-EU relations.  Where the future of the relationship will actually go 
depends largely on how they see each other’s interests and what expectations they 
have for foreign relations strategy. It is hoped that looking at it from the perspective 
of Chinese media analysis will shed some light on the prospect.   
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Figure 1 Changing Nature of European News Coverage in the People’s Daily, 1989-
2014 
 
 
Figure 2 Changing Tone of EEC/EU News Stories in the People’s Daily, 1989-2014 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 Changing Framing of EEC/EU News Stories in the People’s Daily, 1989-2014 
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Figure 4 Subject distributions of EC/EU-China Relations News Stories in the People’s 
Daily, 1989-2014 
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